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Abstract—The 802.11 standard speciﬁes mechanisms for chan-
nel access, data delivery, authentication and privacy for wireless
communication. The standard makes no provisions for faulty,
selﬁsh or malicious behavior assuming that nodes always act
according to the speciﬁcations of the protocol. Thus, nodes
running defective protocol implementations, misconﬁgured, or
compromised can potentially cause signiﬁcant disruption in the
network. In this paper we present an analysis of channel access
denial of service attacks against 802.11b. We demonstrate the
attacks through simulation and analyze them by considering
the effect of multiple attackers, their relative positioning and
the timing of the attack, missing from the previous papers.
Our study of the attacks under varying timing provides a new
direction for developing mitigation techniques at a higher layer
completely independent of the Medium Access Control(MAC).
In addition, we identify and describe new attacks against the
beacon-based synchronization mechanism used for channel access
and by the power saving mode in 802.11a, b, and g. We
provide simulation results that demonstrate their feasibility and
analyze them considering the attacker’s effort versus the induced
damage and effect on other protocols and services. Finally, we
discuss some detection and mitigation techniques for the analyzed
attacks, demonstrating the efﬁcacy of several of them through
simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 802.11 [1] standard speciﬁes a family of protocols
developed by IEEE for wireless LANs. The most well-known,
802.11b [2], supports 11 Mbps in the 2.4 GHz band and
speciﬁes mechanisms for channel access, data delivery, au-
thentication and privacy. Two operation modes are deﬁned:
infrastructure, in which nodes communicate with each other
through an access point (AP) and ad hoc in which nodes
communicate directly with each other without the use of an
AP. In the ﬁrst case, the standard also speciﬁes the distribution
services which enable a node to roam between several APs.
Wireless communication protocols design must address major
challenges not encountered in the wired environment. They
include: 1) the difﬁculty to detect collisions; 2) the shared
medium; 3) the limited available spectrum; and 4) the limited
energy available to wireless devices. Thus, wireless protocols
have to address the multi-path fading of a radio signal that may
result in inability of detecting collisions, or the hidden terminal
problem where transmissions from two or more senders –
who do not hear each other’s transmissions – may collide
at a receiver. In addition, they must minimize the control
information and maximize the utilization of the available
spectrum, co-ordinate the access to the shared medium, and
use energy efﬁciently by limiting not only transmissions, but
also unnecessary listening of the channel. IEEE 802.11 copes
with such challenges by using:
 two channel access mechanisms that provide collision
avoidance: the Distributed Co-ordinationFunction (DCF),
and the Point Co-ordination Function (PCF).
 a Power Saving Mode (PSM) that allows nodes to go to
sleep while they are waiting for the channel to become
available for transmissions. PSM requires synchronization
between a point co-ordinator (PC) and the other nodes.
The synchronization is achieved using beacon packets
sent periodically by the PC.
In addition, 801.11 deﬁnes authentication services: Open
System (a null authentication scheme) and Shared Key [1]
where authentication is carried based on a shared secret
key and is deﬁned by the wired equivalent privacy (WEP)
protocol. The WEP protocol also deﬁnes conﬁdentiality and
message integrity. Conﬁdentiality is provided using encryption
via a stream cipher, RC4, (relying on a secret key and an
input vector sent in clear), while integrity is provided using
the CRC32 scheme. 802.11 also provides several services
that allow a node to move between several APs. The most
important are the association and disassociation services which
allow a node to inform an AP that it needs or no longer
requires the service of that AP.
The standard makes no provisions for faulty, selﬁsh or
malicious behavior assuming that nodes always act according
to the speciﬁcations. Thus, nodes running defective protocol
implementations, misconﬁgured, or compromised can poten-
tially cause major disruption in the network. Signiﬁcant work
has focused on analyzing security vulnerabilities in wireless
networks at higher network layers, especially routing [3]–[11].
There is some work [12]–[14], [27] on studying the impact
of selﬁsh or malicious behavior at the MAC level, but has
mainly focused on identifying attacks and not studying its
impact in varying conditions like timing of attack, number of
attackers and their relative positions. The absence of security
mechanisms enforcing the correct functionality of the MAC
layer can prevent many protection schemes proposed at higher
levels to achieve their design goals.
In this paper we analyze the impact of denial of service
(DoS) attacks against MAC protocols for wireless networks
focusing on 802.11. More precisely, we use simulations to
provide a detailed analysis of 802.11b channel access attacks
introduced in [13], [14]. Our contributions in this paper are
to 1) study the impact of multiple attackers, their relative
positioning and the effect of timing of the attack, 2) signiﬁcant
contribution stems from the study of timing of attacks hinting
at suitable higher layer protocols for preventing attacks at
lower layers, 3) we identify a class of new attacks called!
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Fig. 1. Using NAV for channel reservation
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Fig. 2. PCF operation
synchronization attacks discussing their impact against the
beacon-based synchronization mechanism used by the PCF
and PSM components of 801.11b, and ﬁnally 4) we propose
detection and mitigation techniques to counter each attack. The
results for synchronization attacks indicate that while being
low rate attacks, they bring the throughput down to near zero
for PCF and can disrupt any service or protocol relying on
synchronization (examples include protocols for sensor [17],
and mesh [18] networks).
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section I-
A describes in details channel access mechanism of 802.11b,
while Section I-B overviews prior research identifying vulner-
abilities against 802.11. We describe the channel access and
synchronization attacks in Section II, analyze them in Section
III, and propose mitigation techniques in Section IV. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section V.
A. 802.11 Channel Access Mechanisms
The core of the 802.11 standard are the mechanisms for
channel access: the Distributed Co-ordination Function (DCF),
which is mandatory and the Point Co-ordination Function
(PCF) which is optional. DCF is a Carrier Sense Multi-
ple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol, which
employs an exponential back off mechanism and a channel
reservation scheme (presented in Figure 1). The purpose of
the channel reservation scheme is to avoid the hidden terminal
problem. A node desiring to send makes a request by sending
a RTS packet, while the node receiving the data accepts
the transmission by sending a CTS packet. The sender also
speciﬁes the time needed to transmit the data, through a
Network Allocation Vector (NAV) value carried by both RTS
and CTS packets. Nodes which lie within the listening range of
a transmitting node record that NAV value and increase their
back off time accordingly, since the channel will be busy.
PCF is a contention-free protocol, enabling nodes to trans-
mit data synchronously, with regular time delays between data
transmissions. This is achieved by using a point co-ordinator
(PC) that controls which nodes can transmit during any given
period of time. Within a time period referred as the contention
free period, the PC polls all stations operating in PCF mode
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Fig. 4. Synchronization using beacon: ad hoc mode
to check if they have data to transmit. Each node can transmit
during a speciﬁc period of time. 802.11 allows DCF and PCF
to coexist, deﬁning how nodes alternate between DCF and
PCF: on one period of time nodes will restrain from using
CSMA, while the next time period, the nodes will wait for a
poll from the PC before sending data frames.
In addition, 802.11 speciﬁes how nodes can save power by
using a Power Saving Mode (PSM). PSM speciﬁes that a node
can periodically go to sleep if it has no data to receive, and
check with the PC (every time it wakes up) if data is waiting
for it. A node can communicate to the AP its sleep schedule
and the AP will buffer packets while the node sleeps.
Both PCF and PSM require synchronization amongst the
PC and the stations. In order to achieve this synchronization,
the PC transmits beacons at periodic intervals. The beacon
packets are broadcasted in clear containing a time stamp. The
nodes listening to the beacon adjust their clocks according to
the time stamp in the beacon packet. Typically, the base station
broadcasts a beacon frame periodically (10 to 100 times per
second). In the PCF mode the initial beacon sent out by the PC
denotes the start of the polling period or contention free period.
As shown in Figure 2 the beacon contains a NAV indicating
the length of the contention free period. All nodes back off
according to this NAV value and wait for the polling packet
for transmitting data. Each node on receiving the poll message
transfers its data. No RTS/CTS mechanism is employed during
the contention free period.
The beacon packet also contains the next time when a
beacon will be transmitted. If the channel is busy, the beacon
is transmitted when the channel becomes free and the time
stamp is adjusted accordingly (see Figure 3). In case of an
ad-hoc mode where no PC is available, synchronization using
beacons is carried out in a distributed fashion (see Figure 4). At
the start of each beacon interval, each node chooses a random
back off timer and listens to the channel. If a beacon is heard
before one’s timer expires, then that node ends its timer and
does not send a beacon. All nodes which hear the beacon
adjust their clocks according to the time stamp value. If no
beacon is heard and the timer expires then the node sends a
2beacon containing the time stamp.
B. Related Work
Several vulnerabilities have been identiﬁed for 802.11b.
They include attacks against conﬁdentiality and integrity, de-
authentication and de-association attacks, and selﬁsh behavior
from nodes who obtain unfair access to the channel.
Conﬁdentiality and integrity: Signiﬁcant research focused
on analyzing the conﬁdentiality and integrity services provided
by WEP for 802.11. Borisov et. al. [12] have shown several
attacks against WEP that allow for modiﬁcation of existing
frames, injection of spoofed frames, as well as decryption
of the communication, without breaking the shared secret
key. The attacks rely on the reuse of the keystream of the
encryption cipher and of the fact that integrity does not rely
on a secret key. A total break of security of WEP, by recovering
the shared secret key, was shown in [19]. Follow-up protocols
such as Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and 802.11i [20] were
proposed to provide enhanced MAC layer security. For a
detailed description of their limitations, see [21].
Authentication and association: An attack in which the au-
thentication service can be easily bypassed, without knowing
the shared secret WEP key was shown in [12]. DoS attacks
against both authentication and association were shown in
[22]. The authors proposed a new authentication framework to
address the identiﬁed vulnerabilities. Both the authentication
and association protocols suffer from a vulnerability in which
a node or AP can explicitly request de-authentication or de-
association from each other via a message that is transmitted
in clear and is not authenticated. This creates opportunities
for DoS, as it was successfully demonstrated in [13]. Finally,
to provide a long-term solution to the security problems of
802.11, the 802.11 TGi working group has proposed the
standard use of the 802.1X and 802.11i protocol. Recently
a security analysis [21] of 802.11i pointed out several vulner-
abilities and suggested improvements.
Selﬁsh use of the channel: Several attacks were pointed out
in which selﬁsh nodes try to obtain unfair use of the channel
by exploiting either the CSMA mechanism or the NAV-based
channel reservation mechanism. [23] identiﬁed a number of
security vulnerabilities in the MAC protocol, including attacks
against the virtual carrier-sense mechanisms, but presented
no empirical validation. [24] examined DoS MAC attacks in
ad hoc networks and demonstrated that MAC fairness can
mitigate the problem. The emulated fair MAC they experiment
with, serves as a proof of concept but cannot be implemented
in a distributed manner. Authors in [27] propose DOMINO
to prevent greedy behavior in 802.11. They do not analyze
the attacks with timing variations or number of attackers. A
CSMA/CA back off based DoS attack against 802.11b was
identiﬁed in [14]. The authors propose as defense to have
the receiver controlling the back off window of the sender.
An attack that exploits the channel reservation mechanism by
setting the NAV value always to the allowed maximum, was
presented in [13]. In addition, several mitigation techniques
that do not use cryptographic protocols, were also proposed.
We discuss the limitations of these mitigation techniques in
Section IV.
II. CHANNEL ACCESS ATTACKS AGAINST 802.11B
In this section we present several attacks that are the focus
of this paper. The attacks exploit the channel access mecha-
nisms of the 802.11b MAC protocol. The NAV and CSMA/CA
attacks were previously reported in [13] and [14], but provide
an overview here to make their analysis in Section III easy to
follow. The synchronization attacks based on beacon are new
attacks on MAC of wireless networks.
A. NAV-Based Attack
802.11b uses a RTS/CTS mechanism to avoid collisions due
to hidden nodes. Nodes transmit a NAV value in the packets
in order to indicate the duration of the transmission. All nodes
who listen to the packet will back off for the time indicated
by the NAV value.
An attack against the availability of the channel, exploiting
the channel reservation mechanism is possible as follows. A
malicious node, instead of behaving correctly, will send a RTS
packet with a high NAV value. All the other nodes hearing
the RTS (or the corresponding CTS) will mark this NAV
value and back off accordingly. If the attacker keeps sending
RTS packets with a high NAV then it can block the channel
and hence cause a DoS in the network. The highest allowed
value for the NAV is 32767 which is approximately 32 ms.
The attacker can send 30 packets/sec each with the NAV set
to 32767 making the channel access exclusive to itself. The
other nodes constantly back-off as they ﬁnd the channel busy,
bringing their throughput potentially to zero.
B. CSMA/CA-Based Attack
802.11b uses carrier sense multiple access with collision
avoidance (CSMA/CA) to avoid collisions in the shared
medium. Brieﬂy, the mechanism works as follows: each node
listens to the channel and sends a packet only if the channel
is idle. If the channel is busy, the node will defer its trans-
mission till the channel becomes available, plus an additional
contention period to avoid collisions. Each node maintains a
contention window divided in slots. The contention period is
a randomly chosen slot based on the contention window size.
The CSMA/CA attack exploits the contention period. More
speciﬁcally, if a (potentially compromised) node selﬁshly
reduces its contention window, it will wait a smaller back
off period and thus get priority in accessing the channel. This
behavior can potentially lead to a decreased throughput for the
other nodes in the network, because they will ﬁnd the channel
busy and follow exponential back off procedure. Thus a node
with the smallest contention period will obtain the highest
throughput, at the expense of the other nodes.
C. Beacon-Based PCF Attack
As described previously in Section I-A, a beacon packet
is used in the PCF mode to allow polling by the point co-
ordinator (PC). A node or AP can act as the PC. The PC sends
3the beacon packet to specify the start of the contention free
period (CFP). The nodes go to sleep once they hear the beacon
packet. The PC polls each node for data packets to transmit
and once a node receives a poll message they discontinue their
wait and send the data to the PC. During the CFP no RTS/CTS
packets are transmitted. Instead a node transmits only when
it receives the poll message. A malicious node can affect the
throughput of other nodes by sending a beacon packet and
holding back the poll message. In this case, the normal node
will go to sleep while waiting for the poll message that never
arrives and thus prevents it from sending data. The result can
be a zero throughput for that node.
D. Beacon-Based Synchronization Attack
Both PCF and PSM require synchronization amongst the
PC and the nodes, achieved via beacon packets. An important
information carried by the beacon is the next time when a
beacon will be transmitted, i.e. the start of the next CFP, along
with the current time stamp. If the channel is busy during that
time, the beacon is transmitted when the channel becomes
available and the time stamp is adjusted accordingly. In the
case of the ad-hoc mode where no PC is available, beacon-
based synchronization is carried in a distributed fashion. At the
start of a beacon interval each node chooses a random back
off timer and listens to the channel. If a beacon is heard by a
node before its timer expires then that node ends its timer and
a beacon is not sent until the next beacon interval. All nodes
which hear the beacon adjust their local clocks according to
the time stamp in the beacon. If no beacon is heard and the
timer expires at a node then it sends a beacon containing the
current time stamp, if the channel is free.
PSM is used by nodes to save power while they are waiting
for the channel to become available for transmission. A node
can go to PSM i.e. sleep at a particular time which is supported
by the AP. During the period of sleep the AP buffers the
packets and hands them over to the node when it wakes up. If
a node wakes up at a different time than what the AP expects,
it can loose the data waiting for it. The result can potentially
be a reduced throughput for the de-synchronized node.
A malicious node can attack both PCF and PSM by de-
synchronizing the clocks of correct nodes. The clock of a
correct node can be deviated by sending a single beacon
with a malicious time stamp value. This clock error will
exist until a correct beacon is received by that node. The
de-synchronization introduced will inherently de-stabilize any
protocol or service which depends on synchronization.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we demonstrate the above described attacks
through simulations and analyze their potential impact. We use
the 2.27 NS-2 simulator [25] to simulate the attack scenarios.
In addition, we implement a modiﬁed 802.11 MAC protocol
that has the behavior of a malicious node. For both the NAV
and CSMA/CA back off attacks, the simulation is conducted
with a topology consisting of eight static nodes positioned
around one AP, which is centrally placed amongst the nodes.
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Fig. 5. NAV Attack: CBR ﬂows, one malicious node
The nodes are not placed in a pure circular fashion around the
AP, but following a rectangle, such that some nodes are closer
to the AP than others to study the impact of location on the
attacks.
A. NAV-Based Attack
We study the NAV attack using multiple attackers and
varying the number of nodes, as well as the effect of the the
transport mechanism on the attack. The attack is simulated by
setting the malicious node duration value for RTS and CTS
packets to the maximum possible value i.e. 32767. We use a
topology of 8 nodes with a centrally placed AP. In order to
study the effect of timing on attacks, We consider different
starting times of malicious nodes as compared to the correct
nodes. The trafﬁc generating agent for “early start” of the
malicious node is started 1 second earlier than other nodes
whereas for “late start” it starts 10 seconds after other nodes.
For all the scenarios the packet size is set at 1000 bytes and
the simulation is run for 200 seconds.
1) CBR Flows: The CBR ﬂows are established between all
the nodes and the AP, the underlying trafﬁc being provided by
UDP agents attached to all the nodes.We investigate the impact
of the NAV attack for CBR ﬂows by selecting different inter
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Fig. 6. NAV Attack: CBR ﬂows and 2 malicious nodes
packet arrival times. The inter packet interval is set to 0.005,
0.033, and 0.05 seconds which corresponds to packet rate of
200, 30, and 20 pkts/sec respectively.
Figure 5 presents results when there is one malicious node,
STA 4. As it can be seen in Figure 5 (a), for a CBR inter
packet interval of 0.005 seconds (packet rate of 200 pkts/sec),
for all the starting cases the malicious node is able to have full
control of the medium. This is because all the other nodes hold
their transmission by setting up their back off values to the
duration values set in the malicious node’s packets. The same
behavior can be observed in Figure 5 (b), which indicates
that just by transmitting 30 packets/sec the malicious node is
able to effectively cause DoS for all the other nodes. This
effect is prevalent for all the starting cases as the malicious
node is able to obtain full control of the medium. Even at
a low packet rate of 20 pkts/sec (Figure 5 (c)) the malicious
node manages good control of the channel, but in this scenario
other nodes also manage to transmit. The low packet rate of
the malicious node enables other nodes to transmit after the
time when the NAV duration limit set by the malicious node
expires. For very low packet rates the malicious node is not
able to affect the throughput of other nodes. This is because of
the fact that whenever other nodes have a packet to transmit,
they are not restricted by the duration value transmitted in the
last packet sent by the malicious node because of larger inter
packet interval of the malicious node.
Figure 6 investigates the effect of the placement of the ma-
licious nodes. There are two malicious nodes in the network.
In the ﬁrst case the nodes are situated far apart (STA 4 and 5),
while in the second case the nodes are adjacent (STA 4 and
8). The CBR inter packet interval is set at 0.033 (packet rate
of 30 pkts/sec) since this was the minimum interval that was
observed to cause DoS when only one malicious node existed
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Fig. 7. NAV Attacks: TCP Flows
in the network. As seen in Figure 6, the addition of another
malicious node results into stronger control of the medium by
the malicious nodes and a more pronounced DoS effect for
the correct nodes. The starting times for the malicious node
does not degrade the effectiveness of the attack. By comparing
results from Figure 6 (a) and (b) it is evident that the relative
location of malicious node does not affect the effectivness of
the DoS attack for CBR ﬂows.
Since NAV attack requires an attacker to initially contend
for the channel and the attack is only successful once it gains
the channel, higher layer protocol plays an important role
in holding the channel. To further investigate this issue we
repeat the experiments by replacing CBR ﬂows with TCP
ﬂows because in TCP one has to relinquish the channel to
receive the TCP Ack.
2) TCP Flows: Here we present results when trafﬁc con-
sists of TCP ﬂows, established in between all the nodes and the
AP. The underlying trafﬁc is provided by TCP agents attached
to all the nodes.
Figure 7 (a) depicts the throughput when only one node,
STA 4, is malicious. It can be noticed that when the malicious
node starts the TCP ﬂow earlier than other nodes, it is able
to take full control of the medium for the whole run of the
5simulation. This results into a complete DoS for all the other
nodes. However, for the “same start” and “late start” cases, the
malicious node does not control the channel or in other words
the attack is not successful. If a malicious node starts early
then it gets exclusive access to the channel while in case of
“same start” and “late start”, the malicious node has to contend
for the channel before it can cause DoS. The attack gets further
mitigated when TCP is used because of the transmission of
the TCP-Ack packet by the AP. Thus, whenever AP takes the
channel away from the malicious node to transmit TCP-Ack
packets it attempts to transmit such packets to the well behaved
nodes as well. This takes the control of the medium away from
the malicious node and as a result the impact is not as strong
as for “early start” case where AP always transmits TCP-
Acks packets to malicious node only, allowing it to control
the channel.
This corroborates that a NAV attack to be successful needs
support from higher layer to hold the channel for indeﬁnite
periods like in CBR. A suitably designed higher layer protocol
which prevents holding longer one-way trafﬁc sessions can
mitigate NAV attack. To study multiple attackers, We introduce
one additional malicious node in the network. Figure 7 (b) and
(c) depict the case when there are two malicious nodes, again
in the ﬁrst case the nodes are far away, while in the second case
they are adjacent. It can be noticed that for “early start” the
malicious nodes cause complete DoS for all the other nodes.
This does not happen however, for the “same start” scenario.
Interestingly, in case of “late start” the throughput of one of
the malicious nodes (STA 5) drops drastically to nearly zero
whereas STA 4 is still able to maintain higher throughput than
others. This effect is attributed to the combination of TCP
acknowledgement aspect and the randomness in the selection
of the congestion window by contending nodes. As seen in
Figure 7 (c), the relative location helps the malicious nodes
to maintain better control of the medium also for “same start”
and “late start” cases.
B. CSMA/CA-Based Attack
We simulate the behavior of a malicious node using the
CSMA/CA back off attack, by varying the contention window
(CW) size. The CW is presented as a fraction of the window
used by the attacker over the actual window size. For example
if the total slot size for a normal node is 32, and the CW
fraction is 0.75, the attacker is using only 0.75*32 slots for
calculation of the back off. Since the total slot size is reduced
he choses a lower back off on average.
To analyze the effect of higher layer protocol we use both
CBR and TCP ﬂows. We vary the number of malicious nodes
to identify the impact of the number of malicious nodes and
location on the throughput degradation. The throughput is
calculated for all nodes and plotted against varying values of
the congestion window of the malicious node.
1) CBR Flows: The inter packet interval is set to 0.033
giving a packet rate of 30 pkts/sec.
Figure 8 (a) shows the throughput when there is only one
malicious node (STA 4), whereas the rest of the nodes use
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Fig. 8. CSMA/CA Attack: CBR Flows
the standard 802.11b protocol. The results indicate that the
malicious node maintains a higher throughput for all CW
fractions less than 1. Even when the malicious node reduces
its CW to 0.75, the impact is quite strong. For smaller values
the effect is much more pronounced as the malicious node is
able to take full control of the medium and maintain a very
high throughput at the expense of the other nodes.
Figures 8 (b) and (c), show results for the case when two
nodes are malicious. The nodes are chosen such that in ﬁrst
case (Figure 8 (b)), the malicious nodes (STA 4 and 5) are
far apart from each other, while in the second case (Figure
8 (c)), the malicious nodes (STA 4 and 8) are close to each
other. The experiment demonstrates that the malicious nodes
maintain a very high throughput while sharing the medium,
at the expense of a signiﬁcant throughput decrease for correct
nodes. For a CW of 0.5 or smaller, the two nodes control the
channel. Also, by examining all three graphs from Figure 8 it
appears that the relative location of malicious nodes does not
affect the throughput degradation for the other nodes, in both
cases, the malicious nodes being able to send at the maximum
rate. This is also because the SNR observed by the malicious
nodes is similar because of the CBR ﬂow operating in the
network which offers little or no variability.
2) TCP Flows: We perform the same experiments for TCP
ﬂows established between all the nodes and the AP.
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Fig. 9. CSMA/CA Attack: TCP Flows
Figure 9 (a) presents the throughput achieved, when only
one node, STA 4, is malicious. The results indicate that the
malicious node obtains a higher throughput than the other
nodes for most of the CW values.
The graphs obtained in TCP differ distinctly from those in
CBR. This is due to the fact that TCP trafﬁc is two-way:
data and acknowledgments (TCP-Ack) packets. The higher
layer protocol (i.e. TCP) forces the MAC layer to wait for the
TCP-Ack packet, hence relinquishing the channel. After the
TCP-Ack is received, the attacker has to again contend for the
channel by choosing a random back off. Because the attacker
has to contend for the channel repeatedly and chose a random
back off, the effect of the attack is not as pronounced as in
CBR. In contrast, because of the one way ﬂow in CBR, the
attacker gets the channel repeatedly and is never relinquished.
A malicious node may also corrupt the TCP functionality, but
here we would like to draw attention to the coupling between
layers which can be used to design secure protocols.
Another interesting observation is that the impact of the
malicious node is different on the other nodes for different
settings of CW. Figure 9 (a) shows that the malicious node
(STA 4) reduces the throughput of nodes STA 2, 5 and 7 to
nearly zero for its CW fraction of 0.5. However, at a CW
fraction of 0.75 the impact is more pronounced for node STA
6. Since the channel capacity is ﬁxed, a malicious node it will
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Fig. 10. Beacon-Based PCF Attacks: More Point-Co-ordinators
obtain more bandwidth at the expense of some other node(s).
The results presented in Figure 9 (b) and (c), consider
scenarios when two nodes are malicious. In the ﬁrst case
(Figure 9 (b)), the malicious nodes (STA 4 and 5) are situated
far from each other. When compared to their impact for CBR
ﬂows the results for TCP ﬂows do not depict high throughput
for the malicious nodes for all the CW fractions less than 1.
For example, at a CW fraction of 0.75 the throughput of STA
4 nose dives to zero whereas STA 5 is still able to maintain
a high value. However, the results do depict that for very low
values of CW both malicious nodes are able to obtain full
control of the channel. The difference in results for CBR and
TCP ﬂows is attributed to the reason that for TCP ﬂows the
medium control is more often taken away from the malicous
node because of the transmission of the TCP-Ack packet by
the AP. This reduces the amount of time for which the channel
is occupied by a node and hence reduces the throughput.
Figure 9 (c) shows the attack impact of the relative location
of the malicious nodes. In this case, where the malicious
nodes (STA 4 and 8) are adjacent, the impact of the attack
is stronger and thus results into higher overall throughput for
the malicious nodes. The location of a node determines the
channel conditions seen by it and hence the SNR. Spatial
proximity leads to similar channel conditions and hence STA
4 and 8 have similar throughput variation while throughput
variation is different when STA 4 and 5 are malicious.
C. Beacon-Based PCF Attack
The beacon-based PCF attack is simulated under two dif-
ferent topologies, one consisting of 5 nodes and the other
consisting of 8 nodes. In the normal fault-free case there is a
single PC in the form of AP. The throughput shown in Figure
10 denoted as PC-5 or PC-8, represents the throughput in a
non-adversarial environment.
In the malicious scenario we make a node to act as a PC
along with the correct AP. The malicious node sends beacons
to initiate the CFP, but restrains from sending the poll message.
Figure 10 shows that the throughput in case of malicious
behavior, denoted as Malicious-5 and Malicious-8, drops to
nearly zero. During the entire simulation time of 200 seconds
only 34 packets are generated and transmitted by the malicious
node in the form of beacons, while over 2000 packets are lost
by the correct nodes. Thus, the results indicate that this attack
is low rate requiring very little complexity at the attacker and
resulting in maximum damage to the correct nodes.
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Fig. 11. Beacon-Based Synchronization Attacks
D. Beacon-Based Synchronization Attack
We conducted simulations of the synchronization attack in
a scenario where STA 1 runs a copy of a malicious MAC
that sends beacon packets with incorrect time stamps only
during the CFP period. Figure 11 plots the clock of normal
nodes (under attack) versus the global clock. In case of normal
operation the clock of the node must match the global clock
and hence the plot must be a straight line without any jumps.
In case of a malicious attack, the clock of a normal node can
be deviated by sending a single beacon with a malicious time
value. This error in clock will exist until a correct beacon is
received by that node.
It is evident from Figure 11 that the larger the CFP period
of a malicious node, the larger the ﬂuctuations in the clock.
This is because the malicious node sends more beacons with
random time stamps during the large CFP period. In Figure
11 (d) the malicious node has a double CFP period compared
to the correct PC causing the malicious node to send a lot
more beacons. Thus it leads to more ﬂuctuations in the clock.
We note that this is a low rate attack: by sending only one
beacon packet during each beacon interval, a malicious node
can cause signiﬁcant de-synchronization in the network.
The level of de-synchronization observed in Figure 11 may
lead to failure of several features in other protocols which
inherently depend upon synchronization. For example, the
PSM mode depends upon synchronization between the AP
and nodes which can be rendered useless by such a de-
synchronization attack. De-synchronization can affect several
protocols in wireless networks. Collective sleeping method-
ology [26] adopted in MAC protocols for sensor networks,
would also fail under such an attack, which in turn can lead
to high power usage and loss of communication amongst the
neighbor nodes. Another example is the packet leashes [11]
protection against wormholes attacks, which also depends on
global synchronization amongst the nodes of the network.
Thus, such an attack is not limited to 802.11a, b, and g, but
can also be carried against several other wireless protocols.
IV. ATTACK DETECTION TECHNIQUES
A. NAV-Based Attack Detection
One method to detect the NAV attack, without using cryp-
tographic mechanisms, is proposed in [13]. The proposal is
to make nodes to listen to the next slot and verify if the
transmission is still going on. The method does detect the
attack, but has limitations such as preventing the implemen-
tation and deployment of any sleeping mechanism since the
nodes have to always sense the channel. Another limitation is
that it cannot detect an attacker who sends data throughout
the alotted transmission time and keeps the channel occupied.
Such a scenario can occur when a malicious node sends a large
NAV and then transmits for only a few slots before ceasing
its transmission. In this scenario the other nodes will have to
listen to each slot before sensing the channel to be idle.
Our simulations demonstrate that by designing an appropri-
ate protocol at higher levels the attack can easily be nulliﬁed.
The experiments in Section III-A, show that if TCP is used
at higher layers, then the AP tries to send the TCP acknowl-
edgment back to the malicious node, causing the malicious
node to relinquish the channel. If the malicious node gives
up the channel, to regain it back, it has to again compete
with all the nodes in the vicinity. A malicious node can only
control the channel after it gets access to the channel once but
using TCP causes it to give up the channel after a small time.
This causes the malicious node to repeatedly try and contend
for the channel thus annulling the attack. Our results indicate
that MAC protocols must provide some form of ﬂow control
and fairness, potentially by coupling these mechanisms with
transport layer protocols to guarantee an attack free operation.
B. CSMA/CA-Based Attack Detection
A possible detection technique to this attack is proposed in
[14]. The solution entails the receiver with the responsibility
8of assigning the back off to the sender piggy backed on the
CTS packet. The receiver can use a deterministic function or
assign such a function to the sender to select the back off value.
This approach may work in an infrastructure mode which has
an in-built central point, however, it cannot be applied for an
ad hoc network, in a distributed fashion. Consider a scenario
where a node is receiving packets from multiple senders. In
this case, the receiver node must design an optimal function
which ensures fairness to all the senders, and then transmit
it to the senders. This will consume precious bandwidth and
power. In addition, this approach will not work correctly in a
scenario where the receiver itself is malicious and sends large
back off parameters to the sender throttling its bandwidth.
To address these concerns, we propose to use history
information to determine if a node is malicious. Each node,
when ﬁnding the channel busy, will record the identity of
that sender and later use the information to calculate the
probability of the channel being accessed for each node and try
to determine whether it is random or not. This mechanism is
completely distributed and can be run independently at each
correct node. The history information can help in detecting
malicious behavior in any node regardless of it being a sender
or receiver. One advantage of this mechanism is that it is
inexpensive since it relies on computation which is much
cheaper to perform than transmissions in a wireless network.
Because of the ease of use and low complexity, this method
can be also used for ad-hoc and sensor networks which rely
on CSMA/CA based mechanisms to avoid collisions. The
latency of detection of such a mechanism may depend on how
frequently the malicious node tries to access the channel. If the
malicious node is using a smaller back off window but only
transmitting intermittently, then the adversarial effect will be
very small. In such a case state based approach might lead to
longer latency in detection but the effect of the attack will also
be unnoticeable. One can augment this approach with each
node assigning a trust or reputation metric to every neighbor.
C. Detection and Mitigation for Beacon-Based Attack
One way to prevent the attacks is to authenticate every
beacon and to require a node to accept only authenticated
beacons. This way only an authenticated PC or the AP can
send beacons which can be used for time synchronization.
Authentication can remove the attack vulnerability in the case
when the attacker is an outsider, and is appropriate for cen-
tralized scenarios where only one node has the responsibility
of sending the beacon. However, this method will not work
correctly if the authentication protocol is compromised.
In a decentralized scenario (i.e. ad-hoc mode), where the
time synchronization is performed in a distributed fashion, it
is more costly to provide authentication for all the nodes when
nodes are dynamically joining and leaving. One solution that
can protect against the attack to some extent is to have each
node maintaining a guard time. A node can only change its
clock if the time stamp in the beacon and its clock difference
is within the guard time assuming the clock drift is bounded.
We implemented a modiﬁed MAC that maintains a guard of 
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Fig. 12. Guard-Based Approach
about the node’s current clock. As it can be seen in Figure 12,
the smaller the , the closer a node’s clock matches the global
clock. This mechanism has some limitations. If nodes join in
later and clocks are not synchronized then this method can
cause lack of synchronization between the new node and the
existing network if the clocks differ more than the guard time.
The guard time can decrease the effectiveness of the attack,
but an attacker can still try to introduce a drift by repeatedly
sending well crafted time stamps and slowly drifting the clock
of the system i.e. cause slow poisoning in the system.
To address some of these limitations, we present another
state based approach for prevention of synchronization attacks
using beacons. In this approach each node maintains a state
consisting of changes to time clock in the last time interval,
say X. Along with X, a node maintains the identity of the
node which sent that beacon. Each node maintains a history
threshold  which denotes the maximum number of times any
node can cause changes to its clock. So if a node A sent more
than  beacons within X time which caused the clock of node
B to change every beacon, then node B will mark node A as
malicious. From that moment node B ignores any incoming
beacon from node A. As in the above proposed CSMA/CA
mitigation approach, this mechanism can run independently at
each node and is completely distributed.
We implemented this mitigation in the 802.11 MAC pro-
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Fig. 13. State-Based Detection Approach
tocol and performed the same synchronization attacks as in
Figure 11 against the new modiﬁed MAC. One of the nodes in
the network acts maliciously by sending beacons with random
time stamps, while the correct nodes are using the 802.11
MAC with state based approach. The results depicted in Figure
13 show that initially a few malicious beacons are accepted
and the local clock is changed to the time stamp in the beacon.
Once the  threshold is crossed, any further beacons from the
malicious node are ignored.
One can also use the guard band approach in tandem with
the state based approach to achieve much greater defense over
the attack. For example, initial ﬂuctuations which could be
caused in the clock when a state-based approach is used, can
be controlled by using a guard band as shown in Figure 12.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we demonstrate through simulations several
channel access attacks against the 802.11b protocol. We ana-
lyze them by examining the effect of multiple attackers, their
relative positioning and the inﬂuence of the choice of high
level protocols. Our simulations show that when the transport
protocol of choice is TCP, the effect of the attack is not so
strong as when the transport protocol is UDP (for CBR ﬂow).
The relative location of the attackers also has an inﬂuence on
the attack, when the protocol of choice is TCP.
In addition, we identify new synchronization attacks that af-
fect the PSM and PCF components of 802.11. Our simulations
indicate that these beacon-based attacks can create signiﬁcant
damage to a large number of nodes, without requiring a lot of
work on the attacker side, i.e. they are low rate attacks. The
level of de-synchronization observed in our simulations may
lead to failure of several other protocols and services which
rely on synchronization for correct operation.Synchronization
attacks can affect a large class of wirless protocols and we
are studying it further. Finally for every presented attack
we propose and discuss several mitigation techniques. Our
discussion indicates that cryptography-only mechanisms are
not enough in protecting against such attacks and that trust
and reputation based mechanism can help in mitigating the
attacks. Issue of cross-layer design to achieve secure protocol
is deﬁnitely a framework we are looking at.
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